What is DORA threat-led penetration testing?
Under the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA), threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) is a controlled, intelligence-led red team assessment of live production systems supporting a financial entity's critical or important functions. It tests how realistic attack scenarios affect the organization and how its defenses detect and respond. TLPT is an additional obligation for financial entities identified by the relevant authority; it is not required of every organization covered by DORA. For help scoping the relevant assessment, explore Blaze’s DORA security testing support.
Identified entities generally conduct TLPT at least every three years. The active red team testing phase lasts at least 12 weeks, with preparation, threat intelligence, reporting, replay, purple teaming, and remediation planning around it.
For security teams, financial institutions, and control teams, the challenge is to organize an exercise that is realistic, safe, and supported by the evidence needed for supervisory validation. This guide explains DORA TLPT requirements, who must test, how to define scope, and what happens in each phase.
Which rules govern TLPT under DORA?
Articles 26 and 27 of the Digital Operational Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, establish advanced testing and tester requirements. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, published on 18 June 2025, supplies the adopted regulatory technical standards (RTS).
The adopted RTS replace the draft regulatory technical standards published in July 2024 as the reference for eligibility, scope, testing methodology, provider selection, internal testers, reporting, closure, and supervisory cooperation. The three European Supervisory Authorities—EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA—developed the draft standards before adoption by the European Commission. DORA has applied since 17 January 2025; the TLPT RTS are also now in force.
For the broader requirements on ICT risk management, incident reporting, general testing, and supplier oversight, read our DORA compliance overview.
How does TIBER-EU relate to DORA TLPT?
The RTS follow the methodology, process, and structure of TIBER-EU, the European framework for threat intelligence-based ethical red teaming. The updated framework provides operational guidance aligned with DORA's TLPT standards.
A TIBER-EU or national implementation can support a DORA TLPT where it meets Articles 26 and 27, the adopted RTS, and the authority's formal requirements. For significant institutions identified by the ECB, the TIBER-EU SSM Implementation Guide explains the ECB's approach. Its scope is specific to those institutions.
How does TLPT differ from a regular penetration test?
TLPT uses targeted threat intelligence to select realistic attack paths across the systems, people, and processes supporting important financial services. Unlike traditional penetration testing focused on a defined application or network, it evaluates detection and response during an end-to-end adversary simulation.
Area | Regular penetration testing | DORA TLPT |
|---|---|---|
Main objective | Identify and assess exploitable weaknesses in the agreed scope | Evaluate resilience against selected threat scenarios, including detection and response |
Basis for testing | Technical scope and relevant testing methods | Validated scope and targeted threat intelligence |
Scope | Often a specific application, API, network, or cloud environment | Live production systems supporting several or all critical or important functions |
Blue team awareness | Usually coordinated openly; arrangements vary | Blue team is generally unaware during active testing |
Duration | Depends on scope and agreed objectives | Active red team testing lasts at least 12 weeks |
Oversight | Engagement governance agreed with the customer | TLPT authority involvement, approvals, and supervisory validation |
Closure | Findings, remediation recommendations, and possible retesting | Red and blue team reports, replay, purple teaming, summary reporting, and remediation planning |
DORA Articles 24–26 distinguish general resilience testing from TLPT. Financial entities other than microenterprises must ensure appropriate yearly testing of systems and applications supporting critical or important functions. Penetration testing is one available method; this broader testing programme is separate from TLPT for identified entities.
Which financial entities must perform TLPT?
The relevant TLPT authority identifies financial entities required to perform TLPT. Its assessment considers systemic importance, impact on the financial sector, financial stability concerns, ICT risk, and maturity.
Article 2 of the adopted RTS sets quantitative criteria for specified categories and permits an assessment of other financial entities. A company should establish its status with its authority rather than assume that being a bank, insurer, or crypto-asset service provider automatically settles the question.
Financial entity | Examples of identification criteria in Article 2 |
|---|---|
Credit institutions | Global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs), and credit institutions that are part of them |
Payment institutions | More than EUR 150 billion in total payment transaction value in each of the two calendar years preceding the authority's assessment |
Electronic money institutions | In each of those two calendar years, more than EUR 150 billion in payment transactions or EUR 40 billion in outstanding electronic money |
Central securities depositories and central counterparties | Included among the specified categories, subject to the authority's assessment |
Trading venues with electronic trading systems | Defined national market-share leadership or more than 5% Union market share in the specified instrument categories over the relevant two-year period |
Insurance and reinsurance undertakings | Combined premium, technical provision, and asset criteria, including the subset selection rules specified in Article 2 |
This is a summary, not a substitute for the full identification criteria. For trading venues and insurers, the calculation rules and combined conditions matter.
The authority can determine that a financial entity meeting the specified criteria does not require TLPT where its overall assessment does not justify the test. It can also identify other financial entities based on the qualitative criteria. Microenterprises and entities referred to in Article 16(1), first subparagraph, of DORA are excluded from the Article 26 TLPT obligation.
How often is TLPT required?
Identified entities must undertake TLPT at least every three years. The competent authority may increase or reduce the frequency based on the entity's risk profile and operational circumstances.
Track the authority's notification, scope approvals, active testing, and closure deadlines as separate milestones.
What must the TLPT scope cover?
A DORA TLPT must cover several or all critical or important functions and run on the live production systems supporting them. Scope should start with business functions and then identify the underlying ICT systems, processes, and technologies, including outsourced dependencies.
A scope specification document lists all identified critical or important functions, explains which are included or excluded, and records the systems supporting the included functions. It also identifies outsourced systems, relevant providers, jurisdictions, and preliminary objectives or “flags.” The management body approves the scope before it is submitted for authority validation.
For example, payment processing may depend on customer authentication, transaction APIs, payment applications, databases, privileged administration, and cloud infrastructure. A test restricted to the public web application could miss important routes into that function.
This example illustrates scope planning, not a prescribed scenario. The final scope and attack scenarios must reflect the entity's actual dependencies, threat intelligence, and approved risk controls.
How are ICT third-party providers included?
Article 26(3) of DORA requires the financial entity to identify relevant underlying ICT processes, systems, and technologies, including those contracted to ICT third-party service providers. Where providers are included in the TLPT, the financial entity must take the necessary measures to ensure their participation.
Discuss permissions, contacts, technical boundaries, access to evidence, and operational risks early. A cloud or managed service agreement should not be treated as automatic authorization to test shared infrastructure or other customers' environments.
Article 26(4) provides for pooled testing in specified circumstances where direct participation could adversely affect services to customers outside DORA or the confidentiality of their data.
Who takes part in a TLPT?
A TLPT separates day-to-day control, testing, defense, and supervisory responsibilities. Clear roles protect secrecy and allow timely decisions if an exercise creates operational risk.
Participant | Main responsibility |
|---|---|
Financial entity and management body | Resource the exercise, approve scope, and remain responsible for the entity's obligations |
Control team and control team lead | Manage preparation, confidentiality, communications, risks, providers, and coordination |
TLPT authority and test managers | Oversee the exercise, validate or approve required documents, and assess compliance |
Threat intelligence provider | Research relevant threats and the entity's exposure; develop targeted scenarios |
Testers or red team | Prepare the approved test plan, execute scenarios, and document offensive actions |
Blue team | Defend the production environment and later reconstruct detections and responses |
“Control team” is the terminology used in the RTS and the aligned TIBER-EU framework; older material may call it the white team. The control team knows about the exercise while the blue team generally does not during active testing.

Internal testers are an option only where permitted and approved. Significant credit institutions must use external testers, as explained in the internal testing section below.
How does the DORA TLPT testing process work?
The RTS organize TLPT into three phases: preparation, testing, and closure. The testing phase contains targeted threat intelligence and active red team testing. The sections below follow those three phases, then explain the associated summary reporting, remediation planning, and attestation requirements.

1. Preparation: establish governance, providers, and scope
The exercise begins following notification from the TLPT authority. Within three months of receiving that notification, the financial entity submits initiation information, including the project charter, control team lead's contact details, proposed use of internal or external testers, communication channels, and a code name.
The control team establishes risk and secrecy arrangements, maps functions and dependencies, and assesses provider suitability. It supplies evidence of provider compliance to the test managers before contracting. An objection from the authority must be resolved before proceeding.
The scope specification document is due within six months of the same notification. The document needs management approval and authority validation before the testing phase begins.
In practical terms, preparation should establish who can approve changes, how a genuine incident is distinguished from testing, how suppliers participate, and how the exercise can be paused. Leave time for authority feedback and revisions.
2. Testing: threat intelligence and active red team testing
Integrating threat intelligence into attack scenarios
Following approval of scope, the threat intelligence provider analyzes the general and sector-specific threat landscape and gathers actionable intelligence about the financial entity. Relevant information can include exposed services, technologies, leaked credentials, impersonation opportunities, and other evidence that helps explain a plausible attack path.
The provider proposes scenarios that differ in relevant threat actors and tactics, techniques, and procedures and target the critical or important functions in scope. The control team lead selects at least three scenarios, considering intelligence recommendations, test-manager input, feasibility, and the entity's risk profile.
No more than one selected scenario may be non-threat-led and based on a forward-looking, potentially fictitious threat. The targeted threat intelligence report must describe the selected scenarios and satisfy Annex III.
The control team submits the targeted threat intelligence report for authority approval before testers prepare the red team test plan.
Active testing: execute the approved red team plan
After the threat intelligence report is approved, testers prepare the red team test plan using the validated scope and intelligence. The plan defines scenarios, objectives, allowed and prohibited techniques, ethical boundaries, communications, risk controls, and any planned assistance.
The control team and TLPT authority approve the plan before active testing. The active red team testing phase lasts at least 12 weeks; scenarios may run sequentially or concurrently. Testers report progress at least weekly to the control team and test managers.
A “leg-up” is controlled assistance that allows testing to progress when an earlier barrier prevents the team from reaching later objectives. Its use must be governed and documented. A reached objective with assistance should be distinguishable from an unassisted compromise.
The threat intelligence provider remains available during active testing. Changes to scope, systems, objectives, timelines, or techniques must follow the approval process.
If testing creates serious risks to data, assets, or critical services, the control team lead may suspend it. In exceptional circumstances, limited purple teaming may allow continuation as a last resort, subject to prior authority validation. It is not a routine substitute for covert testing.
3. Closure: reports, replay, and purple teaming
After active testing ends, the control team lead informs the blue team that the exercise took place. Testers provide the red team test report within four weeks of the end of active testing.
The blue team receives that report and submits its own report no later than ten weeks after the end of active testing. Its analysis should connect attack actions to detections, logs, response evidence, root causes, and lessons.
Replay of offensive and defensive actions must also take place no later than ten weeks after active testing ends. The control team additionally conducts mandatory purple teaming on topics jointly identified by the testers and blue team. This can explore weaknesses or issues that could not be tested during the active phase.
Replay reconstructs what happened. Purple teaming uses collaboration to investigate and improve specific defensive capabilities. Keep the two activities distinct in planning and reporting.

Summary reporting, remediation, and attestation
Once the authority notifies the control team lead that the red and blue team reports contain the required information, the entity has eight weeks to submit its summary report for approval. The remediation plan is due within eight weeks of that same notification, not automatically eight weeks after active testing ends.
For each finding, the remediation plan records the shortcoming, root cause, proposed measures, priorities, expected completion, responsible staff or functions, and risks associated with implementing or not implementing the measures.
The TLPT authority provides the regulatory attestation required for mutual recognition when the applicable conditions are met. A testing provider's completion letter is not that supervisory attestation.
DORA TLPT timelines and deliverables
The table below summarizes key milestones in Articles 9 to 14 of the adopted RTS. Plan using the actual trigger for each deadline.
Milestone or deliverable | Timing or trigger |
|---|---|
Initiation information and project charter | Within three months of receipt of the TLPT authority's notification |
Scope specification document | Within six months of that notification |
Targeted threat intelligence report | Authority approval before preparation and approval of the red team test plan |
Active red team testing | At least 12 weeks, beginning after test-plan approval |
Progress reporting during active testing | At least weekly to the control team and test managers |
Red team test report | Within four weeks of the end of active testing |
Blue team test report | After receipt of the red team report; no later than ten weeks after active testing ends |
Replay | No later than ten weeks after active testing ends |
Purple teaming | Mandatory closure activity alongside the required replay process |
TLPT summary report | Within eight weeks of the Article 12(7) authority notification |
Remediation plan | Within eight weeks of the same Article 12(7) notification |
Supervisory attestation | Issued by the TLPT authority under the applicable regulatory process |
The total engagement depends on readiness, procurement, threat intelligence, approvals, and closure as well as active testing. Treat a proposed total duration as a planning estimate, not a universal statutory deadline.
What are the requirements for TLPT providers?
Provider selection requires evidence of experience, capability, independence, insurance, and safe delivery. Article 27 of DORA establishes the baseline; Article 7 of the RTS adds specific requirements.
Requirement | External red team | Threat intelligence provider |
|---|---|---|
Minimum assigned team | One manager and at least two additional testers | One manager and at least one additional member |
Manager experience | At least five years in penetration testing and red team testing | At least five years in threat intelligence |
Additional staff experience | At least two years each in penetration testing and red team testing | At least two years in threat intelligence |
Provider references | At least five references from relevant penetration testing and red team assignments | At least three references from assignments in the context of penetration testing and red teaming |
Assigned team's combined participation | At least five previous relevant penetration testing and red team assignments | At least three previous threat intelligence assignments in the context of penetration testing and red teaming |
Evidence and insurance | Detailed CVs, appropriate certifications, and professional indemnity cover including misconduct and negligence | Detailed CVs, appropriate certifications, and professional indemnity cover including misconduct and negligence |
Relevant skills | Financial-entity business knowledge, reconnaissance, risk management, exploit development, physical penetration, social engineering, vulnerability analysis, and communication | Intelligence gathering methods; geopolitical, technical, and sector knowledge; and communication |
Provider references and the assigned team's combined participation are separate checks. Assess the people who will deliver the exercise, alongside the provider's track record. The independence requirements below also apply.
Independence and conflicts of interest
Assess conflicts involving the financial entity, ICT suppliers, and intra-group providers. Personnel providing threat intelligence and external testing for the same TLPT must be appropriately separated, with the additional reporting and conflict safeguards required by Article 7.
Threat intelligence and red team services can come from the same provider where those safeguards are met. Blue team relationships require particular scrutiny; do not assume that separate job titles alone establish independence.
The RTS allow limited exceptions to specified provider requirements in exceptional circumstances, with documented mitigation. They are not a general procurement waiver. The authority's assessment and pre-contracting process remain important.
Questions to ask a prospective provider
Who will deliver our TLPT? Request named leads and assigned staff, their CVs, relevant certifications, and evidence of the required assignments. Confirm how substitutions are handled.
How will intelligence shape our scenarios? Ask how the provider will research your functions, dependencies, exposure, and relevant threat actors, then translate that evidence into attack scenarios.
What happens if testing threatens an important service? Review stop conditions, emergency contacts, suspension decisions, genuine incident escalation, and restoration procedures.
How are independence and confidentiality protected? Check personnel separation, reporting lines, blue team relationships, subcontractors, evidence access, and data retention.
What does the price include? Confirm preparation, intelligence, active testing, scope changes, leg-ups, cleanup, replay, purple teaming, reports, and support for authority-requested revisions.
These are practical procurement questions. An accreditation or certificate supports the assessment but does not replace the legal qualification checks.
Can internal testers carry out DORA TLPT?
Significant credit institutions must use external testers. DORA Article 26(8) applies this rule to credit institutions classified as significant under Article 6(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
Other eligible financial entities may use internal testers with supervisory approval, adequate resources, independence, and the relevant competence. Where internal testers are used, the entity must contract an external threat intelligence provider and use external testers every third test.
Under Article 15 of the RTS, an internal testing policy must address suitability, competence, conflicts of interest, management responsibilities, and training. The internal testing team includes a test lead and at least two additional members. Each must have been employed by the entity or an ICT intra-group service provider for the preceding 12 months.
That 12-month condition concerns employment; it is not a replacement for professional experience requirements. Intra-group provider testers are treated as internal testers.
Using internal testers must not undermine defensive or resilience capabilities or significantly affect ICT resources. Their use must be recorded in initiation documents, the red team report, and the TLPT summary.
How should operational risks be managed?
Live-system testing requires controls for both red team actions and blue team responses. A defender's containment decision can also disrupt an important service.
The control team assesses risks involving sensitive information, secrecy, ethical conduct, genuine incident escalation, critical activities, data integrity, impacts on third parties, and incomplete restoration. Review the assessment as the exercise progresses.
Define permitted actions, stop conditions, emergency contacts, and cleanup responsibilities in advance. The rules prohibit unauthorized destruction, uncontrolled modification, intentional compromise of critical-function continuity, unauthorized testing of out-of-scope systems, and unauthorized disclosure of results.
Restoration includes secure handling and deletion of credentials and collected data, communication of compromised accounts, command-and-control deactivation, and removal of backdoors or tools. Consider whether later backup restoration could reintroduce test artifacts.
These controls make realistic attack simulation possible without treating avoidable production disruption as proof of a successful test.
Joint and pooled TLPTs
A joint TLPT involves several financial entities using the same ICT intra-group provider or belonging to the same group and sharing ICT systems. Pooled TLPT concerns several financial entities and a shared third-party provider in the circumstances described in Article 26(4).
Both arrangements require coordination of scope, authority involvement, confidentiality, scenarios, and evidence. Each entity retains responsibility for its risk assessment and measures. The designated financial entity coordinates the pooled exercise where required; the participating entities must still provide the information and cooperation necessary to cover their own functions. Shared testing can avoid duplication, but it does not automatically discharge every participating entity's obligations.
Confirm the lead authority and designated entity, where applicable, and how deliverables and attestation cover each participant.
Preparing a financial entity for TLPT
Before committing to active testing dates, work through the following preparation steps:
Confirm identification and authority contacts. Record the applicable test cycle, notification, test managers, and supervisory instructions.
Establish the control team. Assign decision-making authority, confidentiality arrangements, and sufficient internal resources.
Map functions and dependencies. Include the supporting ICT systems, third-party services, jurisdictions, and rationale for exclusions.
Assess providers. Check assigned staff, references, insurance, independence, and the authority's procurement requirements.
Define operational safeguards. Agree communications, incident escalation, scope changes, stop conditions, and restoration.
Plan deliverables from the start. Reserve resources for red and blue team reporting, replay, purple teaming, summary reporting, and remediation.
Budget for preparation and internal coordination as well as threat intelligence and red team delivery. Scope complexity, shared providers, jurisdictions, and remediation effort affect the overall cost. A quote for active testing alone will not describe the whole programme.
Making TLPT findings useful
A TLPT should leave the entity with a clear account of the attack paths attempted, what defenses detected, why gaps occurred, and who is responsible for improvements. Connect those findings to remediation priorities, validation of corrective measures, and the entity's ICT risk management framework.
For broader governance and testing obligations, use the DORA compliance overview. To discuss testing scope, provider requirements, and preparation, contact Blaze.




